

# How Many Parachutists will be Needed to Find a Needle in a Pastoral?

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# Intrusion Detection by Soft-computing

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    - *Iris-flower*
    - *KDD-cup-99*

(cont'd)

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*“Intrusion is like a-needle-in-a-hay-stack  
not like an iris family.”*

- *Conjecture 2*

*“No such algorithms  
to efficiently find a needle in a haystack.”*

(cont'd)

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  - ★ *Trainning should be only with normal samples!*
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## How to design an intrusion detection system intelligently, if any?

- Two categories
  - ★ Detection of *known attack*.
  - ★ Detection of *unknown no-normal*.

To detect known-attacks, a lookup-table is enough




Our interest is on detecting *unknown no-normal*.

## **General assumption:**

- TCP/IP connection to a network  
⇒ can be represented by a  $n$ -dimensional vector


## Our Goal

To design a machine which tells  
the input is a *normal* or an *attack*.



A successful result in the literatures seems to be  
*Detection Rate*  $> 90\%$  & *False Alarm Rate*  $< 10\%$

## An example of NN implimentation





## A question


*“Is it possible or not?”*

## Training & Testing

- Frequently used two public domain datasets.
  - ★ Iris-flower dataset.
  - ★ KDD-cup-1999 dataset

## What is iris flower dataset

- 3 families of iris flower  $\Rightarrow$  150 samples in total;
- Each family  $\Rightarrow$  50 samples; Each sample  $\Rightarrow$  4 features.



## **Lots of successes have reported so far**

Castellano et al. (2000)

assumed one to be normal while the other two abnormal.



(by Fuzzy-NN with T-S model)

- abnormal detection rate = 96%
- false alarm rate = 0.6%

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But can we be so optimistic?



When a family of iris is normal then are others abnormal?

## **Let's visualize iris families — Sammon mapping**

Sammon mapping maps points in a high-D space to 2-D


by

keeping distance relation preserved as much as possible

or

approximating distances in the  $n$ -D space  
by distances in 2-D space with a minimal error.

## A Sammon mapping of iris families



## Where do outliers lie?

Not in the domain for the other families!!



Not at the point at random, either.



But outlier usually hides behind Normal.



## □ Challenge 1

### *Attacks by Mutant*

- (1) Assume one family as  $\{Normal\}$*
- (2) Mutate the Normal samples and take them as  $\{Attack\}$ .*
- (3) Train with half of the  $\{Normal + Mutant\}$*
- (4) Test with remaining  $\{Normal + Mutant\}$*

$\Rightarrow$  Will a successful result be possible?

## The 1st warning

*Iris is good to start with but not of so useful.*

## What is the KDD-cup-1999 Dataset?

- *Normal*
- *Attack*  $\Rightarrow$  32 attack types of the 4 categories:

(cont'd)

- *Attack*  $\Rightarrow$  32 attack types of the 4 categories:

- ★ *Probing*

- by proving a vulnerability of the network;

- ★ *Denial-of-Service (DoS)*

- by denying legitimate requests to a system;

- ★ *User-to-Root (U2R)*

- an unauthorized access to local super-user or root;

- ★ *Remote-to-Local (R2L)*

- an unauthorized local access from a remote machine.

## KDD-cup-99 winner's result

Detection rate for 4 attack types

<i>Probe</i>	<i>DoS</i>	<i>U2R</i>	<i>R2L</i>
<i>83.3%</i>	<i>97.1%</i>	<i>13.2%</i>	<i>8.4%</i>

## Detection rate by Sabhnani et al. (2003)

	<i>Probe</i>	<i>DoS</i>	<i>U2R</i>	<i>R2L</i>
<i>Multi-layer Perceptron</i>	88.7	97.2	13.2	5.6
<i>Gaussian Classifier</i>	90.2	82.4	22.8	9.6
<i>K-mean Clustering</i>	87.6	97.3	29.8	6.4
<i>Nearest Cluster Algorithm</i>	88.8	97.1	2.2	3.4
<i>Radial Basis Function</i>	93.2	73.0	6.1	5.9
<i>Leader Algorithm</i>	83.8	97.2	6.6	1.0
<i>Hypersphere Algorithm</i>	84.8	97.2	8.3	1.0
<i>Fuzzy Art Map</i>	77.2	97.0	6.1	3.7
<i>C4.5 Decision Tree</i>	80.8	97.0	1.8	4.6

## **We doubt some sort of the reported success**

- Dimension Reduction by PCA – by Kuchimanchi et al.

- ★ 41-D to 19-D

- (detection accuracy, false positive) = (99.92%, 0.26%)

- ★ while the original being

- (detection accuracy, false positive) = (99.94%, 0.23%)

## Yet another interesting claim

(cont'd)

- Joshi et al. (2005)

- ★ 41-D to 5-D (taking the first five from above)

- (detection accuracy, false positive) = (79%, 21%)

- (using Hidden Markov Process)



Let's not go into detail here, but rather focus on

**Why U2R and R2L attacks resist to be detected?**

## How big is the KDD-cup-1999 dataset?

Labeled 4,898,430 records  $\Rightarrow$  *Training*

Un-labeled 311,029 records  $\Rightarrow$  *Testing*

and

Each record is 41-dimensional vector



Sammon Mapping wouldn't work any more!

*Ratios in the samples for testing*

<i>Normal</i>	<i>Probe</i>	<i>DoS</i>	<i>U2R</i>	<i>R2L</i>
<i>19.5%</i>	<i>1.3%</i>	<i>73.9%</i>	<i>5.2%</i>	<i>0.1%</i>

## Let's try a thought experiment!

- *always-return-random-answer-strategy*

which returns either Normal, Probe, DoS, U2R, or R2L at random regardless of the input.


⇒ a high score to detect DoS attacks, like

<i>Normal</i>	<i>Probe</i>	<i>DoS</i>	<i>U2R</i>	<i>R2L</i>
<i>19.5%</i>	<i>1.3%</i>	<i>73.9%</i>	<i>5.2%</i>	<i>0.1%</i>

## A-tiny-set-of-R2L vs. a-huge-set-of-normal

	Total	Normal	Probe	DoS	U2R	R2L
Labeled for Training	4,898,430	19.9%	0.8%	79.3%	$\approx 0.0\%$	$\approx 0.0\%$
Non-labeled for Testing	311,029	19.5%	1.3%	73.9%	5.2%	0.1%

Fictitious but possible distributions



## □ Conjecture 1


- *U2R, R2L and most of real attacks are like needles in a huge haystack of normals.*

## What does a needle look like in a haystack?

The original Hinton & Nowlan's Needle:

- A-needle  $\Rightarrow$  Only one configuration of 20-bit binary string.  
like (11000 11010 11101 0100)
- Haystack  $\Rightarrow 2^{20} - 1$  search points

A fictitious needle in a haystack in 2D.



## **The reason of our title**

a needle on pastral & random fall of parachutists




How many parachutists will be needed to find  
a needle in a pastoral?



## **Four experiments to look for a needle in pastoral**

1. Random fall – a criterion for comparison
2. What if we permit walks after fall?
3. Neutral mutation
4. Mutation on intron

## Random Fall & Walks after Fall



9-digit octal (= 27-bit binary) never stops a run

## □ Conjecture 2

- *No such effective algorithm to look for a needle*

## Yet anoter difficulty: The 2nd warning

- (2) **Don't assume any expectations a priori!**
- (3) *Trainning should be only with normal samples!*

*“Artificial immune system detects an attack!”*

How fantastic it sounds!

Forrest, Perelson et al. (1994)

*“Self Nonself Discrimination in a Computer”*

But two decades has passed since then and still an open issue.



We hope not, but isn't it just a fantasy?

## □ Challenge 2

*always-return-random-answer-strategy*

vs.

*intelligently designed system*

### *Placebo Experiment*

- (1) Prepare a dataset uniformly from all attack data*
- (2) Test the system with dataset above*
- (2) Compare the result with the random-return-machine*

## The last warning

- (2) *Don't assume any expectations a priori!*
- (3) **Trainning should be only with normal samples!**

## From papers

P. Laskov et al. (2005)

*“In a real application, one can never be sure that a set of available labeled examples covers all possible attacks. If a new attack appears, examples of it may not have been seen in training data.”*

Colin M. Frayn (2006)

*Real-world data are very rarely well-behaved in the sense required by conventional algorithms.*

Me (2005)

“When we know the attack, it’s too late”



## **Train with only normal**

Gomez et al. (2003)

*“A set of fuzzy rules characterized abnormal space using only normal samples.”*

with

10% dataset of KDD-cup-1999 dataset

↓

*“It detects attacks with the detection rate 98.30% and false alarm rate 2.0%.”*

↓

Really satisfactory, if it's really true.

## □ Challenge 2

*Attack by dummy*

- (1) Prepare  $\{Normal\}$  and  $\{Attack\}$  from KDD-cup-99.*
- (2) Create  $\{Dummy\}$  at random*
- (3) Train with only  $\{Normal\}$*
- (4) Test with  $\{Attack\}$  and  $\{Dummy\}$  one by one*



Can a Sommelier be trained without bootlegs?

## CONCLUSION

- *Neither IRIS nor KDD-cup-99 are usefull.*
- *A hacker is a person who is extremely good at finding a pattern which is very close to the normal.*
- *In testing, an attack should be like a mutant-of-normal*
- *Needless to say, however, this article is not to negate the possibility, but*
- *we hope this will be a new start of debate for a emergence of innovative ideas.*