computers still lack the fluidity, adaptability, open-endedness, creativity, purposefulness, and insightfulness we associate with the supreme achievements of human cognitive ability. I am guessing that few would doubt they also still lack the fluidity, adaptability, creativity, purposefulness, and insightfulness we associate with the supreme achievements of human cognitive ability. Is it still true that people are smarter than machines? And if so: Why? While I do not think anyone would claim human-like performance has yet been achieved, I am actually optimistic that incremental progress is occurring in all of these areas, at least up to a point. computers remain, for now, fundamentally nothing more than tools in the hands of their human designers and users, and not autonomous, independent, self-directed, thinking beings, like people. More computer power might be helpful, but it seems pretty clear that this alone will not be sufficient. It may well be, then, that over the next decade, the butterfly will finally emerge from the chrysalis, and truly parallel computing will take flight. It should be noted that the issues here are far from trivial. It is very difficult to know exactly how to frame the computational problem. To underscore this point, consider a cognitive system faced with a series of situation.consequence observations in some domain, and let us assume we all agree that it would be a good thing if the system could use the data to learn something about the relationship between situations and consequences. How best should we construe what should be learned in this situation? Currently in the field of cognitive science, there are two views on this question. One holds that we should construe the learnerfs goal as one of extracting a structured statistical model of the environment.one that explicitly attempts to find the best type of structure to represent the data, and within this the best instance of a structure of a given type [9]. An alternative to this, however, is the position that any taxonomy of alternative types will always provide at best only an approximate characterization of natural structure, so that it is better to define the goal more directly in terms of the problem of optimal prediction, allowing the internal model to remain inchoate instead of explicit (as in a neural network representation; see [17], for further discussion). 17. Rogers TT, McClelland JL. Precis of semantic cognition, a parallel distributed processing approach. Behav Brain Sci. 2008;31:689.749. Human mental abilities are profoundly shaped by experience, and that experience is structured by social, cultural, and governmental institutions. Even in the first few months of life, when the child is nurtured primarily in the informal social and cultural context of the immediate family, many important changes occur in the childfs cognitive, social, emotional, and linguistic capacities that are crucially dependent on the childfs experience. The effort to understand how human cognitive abilities arise will depend heavily on taking full account of these influences, and success in achieving true human-like intelligence in artificial systems may rely on the creation of systems that can exploit these influences (see [25]). 25. Weng J, McClelland JL, Pentland A, Sporns O, Stockman I, Sur M, et al. Autonomous mental development by robots and animals. Science. 2001;291:599.600.